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Abstract
Although hundreds of studies have demonstrated that risk preferences shape people’s choices under uncertainty,
the complexity of how attitudes toward risk play out across various pivotal settings and key populations leaves
considerable gaps in knowledge. We study a unique sample of a cohort of future military leaders at the United
States Military Academy (West Point), nearly all of whom now hold commissions in the US Army officer corps.
Using a hypothetical instrument to elicit preferences across a variety of domains, we find that cadets are risk
averse, on average, which has potentially important implications for future management of military conflicts
and programs. Our results also show that diversity programs aimed at increasing the number of women and
minorities at West Point are likely to increase the average level of risk aversion within the officer corps. This
finding suggests that working with officers to strengthen cognitive flexibility and to be attuned to a possible wedge
between their innate preferences and the needs of the situation may be important, particularly for those who
wish to enter occupational fields where the willingness to take risks is critical.
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Introduction
Military leaders often make dozens of consequential decisions
over the course of a day. Those decisions, whether designing
and operating supply routes, maneuvering armor units on a
battlefield, or determining the strategy for attacking a fixed
position, are made under various states of uncertainty and
have high stakes given the inherent risks to human lives and
material and to the overall success of the mission. Off the
battlefield, military leaders are also called upon to counsel
young soldiers on financial management, personal relation-
ships, and health choices, and to make similar choices for their
own families. These decisions have important consequences
for the well-being of military households and for US national
security.
The significance of military decision-making leads us to
a unique sample of military personnel to explore the factors
shaping this population’s choices. We used well-established
techniques to design a survey to elicit individual risk pref-
erences across a range of situations. We then administered
that survey to a sample of more than 1,000 West Point cadets,
nearly all of whom have now assumed military leadership
roles. In the final step, we married each cadet’s survey results
with data from his or her administrative files to analyze the
role of personal characteristics in cadet decision-making. We
believe that our sample, while very selective compared to the
general population, provides important evidence on the risk
preferences and decision-making of a significant portion of
the Army’s officer corps. Hence, a better understanding of this
group’s risk preferences in a variety of contexts and across
several domains will inform future policy formulation, from
benefits structure to training doctrine, relating to US military
personnel management.
Relevant literature
The theory of risk preferences as expressed in expected util-
ity theory is well established, and hundreds of studies have
been published demonstrating how risk preferences shape peo-
ple’s choices under uncertainty1. These studies face several
common challenges, however, the first among them being
the proper elicitation of risk preferences. At the outset, the
elicitation procedure is shaped by the nature of the decision
to be studied –in particular, what are the risks associated with
the choice being presented (the probabilities) and what are the
risk preferences of the decision-maker in question (the degree
of convexity of the expected utility function). Researchers
then design a range of experiments to illuminate those prefer-
ences. Second, the elicitation techniques tend to fall into two
broad categories –hypothetical (non-incentivized scenarios)
1 The literature on risk preference elicitation is quite large, but Harrison
and Ru¨tstrom (2008a) provide a good overview.
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and non-hypothetical (introducing at least some element of
‘real world’ decision-making)– with a broad literature explor-
ing the differences between the two approaches (Holt and
Laury, 2005; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Cullen et al., 2014;
Cubitt et al., 2001). Researchers debate, for example, whether
hypothetical elicitation is subject to hypothetical bias (Har-
rison and Ru¨strom, 2008b; Murphy et al., 2005), in which
subjects respond according to how they believe (or would like
to believe) they would act in real life, rather than expressing
their true revealed preferences. At the same time, hypothetical
mechanisms allow researchers to address larger samples on
a wide range of potential questions simultaneously. For our
purposes, we utlilize hypothetical approaches so that we can
utilize larger samples in more contexts. Because were are ex-
amining consistency more than predictive power, hypothetical
bias is less of an issue here.
Once the basic elicitation technique is settled, the next
challenge is to ensure the stability of the risk preferences
within the given experimental design. A large body of evi-
dence suggests that risk preferences are not stable across con-
texts or elicitation methods (Reynaud and Couture, 2012; Hud-
son, Lusk, and Coble, 2005; Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe, 2005; Chuang and Schechter, 2015).
Some evidence suggests that context-free lottery choices do
have predictive power in risky choices (Lusk and Coble, 2005),
and numerous studies find that less formal, hypothetical stated
choices are related to risky choices in a theoretically consis-
tent way. Because this lack of preference stability complicates
the task of isolating risk preferences in the choice problem,
researchers have tended to build sets of closely related ques-
tions to test the stability of risk preferences within a given
domain (von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengstro¨m, 2011a).
Pennings and Garcia (2001), for example, find evidence that a
composite measure of risk preferences across elicitation con-
texts and methods can have predictive power in risky choice
situations. This paper follows a similar approach with clusters
of questions focused on a few key domains.
A final challenge is how to balance feasibility and cost
against loss of generalizability. For example, eliciting risk
preferences from selected (nonrandom) populations, such as
students, tends to be highly cost effective but also tends to
reduce average risk aversion and the heterogeneity of risk pref-
erences relative to a general population, suggesting that the
generalizability of results to broader groups is more limited
(von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengstro¨m, 2011b). Even
when the target population is relatively narrow (such as mil-
itary leaders), it can be logistically and financially difficult
to bring them into a laboratory (either physical or virtual)
for rigorous and fully incentivized study. To balance these
tradeoffs, we opted to use a student sample, but because our
student population (West Point cadets) closely resembles and
will join our population of interest (Army officers) we believe
the loss of generalizability is less of a concern.
In addition to the many considerations affecting the choice
of elicitation technique, researchers have also wrestled with
how to distinguish the individual’s risk perceptions –his or
her assessment of the underlying probabilities– from the indi-
vidual’s stated risk preferences as expressed in specific exper-
imental settings. In other words, when researchers observe a
subject’s choice within a given risky situation, they are seeing
the product of two latent explanatory variables, risk percep-
tions and risk preferences. To estimate the effects of one of
these variables, therefore, requires fixing the other one. In the
case of military leaders (as in most other populations), we are
most interested in estimating their risk preferences, thus we
need a way to control for the risk perceptions.
Theoretically, the formation of risk perceptions should be
a straightforward objective exercise of assessing the relative
probabilities of events occurring. If we know the probabilities,
we should just be able to use them as controls. However,
this cognitive process depends on the amount of information
available to the individual, which is very often limited or quite
noisy. Many events, for example, are difficult to predict with
any real precision. What is the probability a particular path
will contain improvised explosive devices (IEDs)? What are
the chances the enemy has established an ambush in front of
us? What is the probability that our amphibious assault will
be repelled on the beach? This lack of data has a tendency to
push even the most ardent empiricists into more subjective
(sometimes referred to as “ambiguous”) assessments of an
event occurring.
Researchers have hypothesized that, in the face of incom-
plete information, other variables play a role in the formation
of risk perceptions. Previous literature suggests that variables
as nebulous as personality type and cultural background af-
fect stated risk preferences (Yang, Coble, and Hudson, 2009;
Haynes et al., 2008), as does the method by which estimates
are generated (Coble, Yang, and Hudson, 2011; Cooke and
Goossens, 2004; Lloyd, 2003; Charness, Gneezy, and Imas,
2013). Researchers have also suggested that the presence of
conflicting information leads subjects to rely on other frame-
works to assign probabilities. It is clear that perceptions of risk
are key determinants in risky choices in a variety of contexts
(Lusk and Coble, 2005, 2008; Lerner et al., 2003) as well
as personal experiences (e.g., experiencing anger or conflict;
Kelly et al., 2009) and background risk of other unrelated
events (Cullen et al., 2014; Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Eeck-
houdt, Gollier, and Schlesinger, 1996; Lusk and Coble, 2008).
The heuristics and biases in risk perceptions are interesting
and well established (e.g., Kahenman and Tversky 1974),
but beyond the scope of this study. We remain interested,
however, in combining the perceptions of risk and individ-
ual risk preferences to predict consequential choices. More
broadly, individual characteristics influence risk preferences.
In the current paper, we focus on observable characteristics
to explain risk preferences in part because from a policy per-
spective, we need to identify factors to explain preferences
from data that are easily and inexpensively obtained.
In light of the role that more subjective heuristics could
be playing, numerous studies have estimated the effects of
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individual characteristics on decision-making under uncer-
tainty, including many involving student populations (Keown,
1989; Cleve et al., 2013). There are, however, surprisingly
few direct studies of decision-theoretic preferences in military
settings, none of which focus primarily on risk. Lahav et al.
(2011) examined time preferences (discount rates) for those in
the military compared with other control groups. They found
that military members exhibited higher relative discount rates,
which they attributed to perceptions of higher occupational
risk than that within the general population. Other studies
(Warner and Pleeter 2001; Simon, Warner and Pleeter 2015)
estimated personal discount rates for military members using
variation in retirement plan timing and benefits, finding rates
between 0 and 30% in the earlier study and 2-7% in the more
recent study. While not a direct test of risk preferences, these
studies suggest that risk preferences may differ between mili-
tary and non-military respondents. Other research highlight
the role of environmental factors and experience. McKenna et
al. (2007) show that sleep deprivation alters risk preferences
(in the general population) and Kelly et al. (2009) show that
combat deployments tend to increase post-war risk-taking be-
havior. And, there are data presented on risk-taking behavior
of current and past soldiers (Garyn-Tal and Shahrabani, 2015)
as well as drug and alcohol abuse among returning combat
soldiers (Wilk et al., 2010). Overall, however, we do not know
of any research directly estimating the risk preferences of
military leaders, a key contribution of this paper. And, which
comparisons between non- and military members would be
interesting, our focus is on variation in risk preferences among
future military leaders.
Data and methods
We study a unique sample of future military leaders from the
United States Military Academy at West Point2. West Point
is a federally funded four-year undergraduate institution with
approximately 4,500 students. All students complete a lib-
eral arts education with a significant core curriculum focused
on math, science and engineering, and all graduates earn a
Bachelor of Science degree in one of dozens of majors. In
addition to its academic requirements, West Point provides
leadership development through military, physical and charac-
ter development programs. To provide some comparison to
other undergraduate settings, Integrated Postsecondary Edu-
cation Data System (IPEDS) data suggest that West Point’s
near-peer institutions in terms of SAT scores are the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin and Boston University3. National ranking
systems place West Point between Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and the University of Pennsylvania (Forbes)
and between Colgate University and Macalester College (U.S.
2 While the majority of these students will receive commissions as offi-
cers in the United States Army, some students cross-commission into other
military branches while others are cadets from foreign militaries.
3 We estimate a median SAT score for each institution using IPEDS data
for the Class of 2017. We estimate the median using the average of the 25th
and 75th percentiles for each institution.
News and World Report)4.
Because all West Point graduates become U.S. Army offi-
cers for a fixed period after graduation (five years on active
duty plus another three years either on active duty or in the re-
serves) and many continue on to longer military careers, these
cadets provide a unique opportunity to study risk preferences
among future military leaders. Moreover, West Point gradu-
ates constitute a large proportion of the Army officer corps,
and a disproportionate number serve in combat roles. There-
fore, while using student samples can lead to biased results
(von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengstro¨m, 2011b), these stu-
dents represent a unique opportunity to study individuals who
will comprise a large proportion of the population of interest
(military decision-makers). This direct match between sample
characteristics and the target population of interest justifies
our novel sample.
To conduct this research, we had instructors in a semester-
long “Principles of Economics” course at West Point admin-
ister a survey during a 60-minute block of a 90-minute lab
period during the 2011-2012 academic year5. The mandatory
nature of the course helps avoid concerns over selection. The
course is required for all students at West Point and nearly
all students take the course during their sophomore year. Our
sample represents 87% of the cohort that earned a commission
from West Point in May 20146.
Prior to distributing the survey, instructors advised stu-
dents that the questionnaire related to making decisions under
uncertainty. Students provided consent prior to participation;
those who did not consent were assigned a reading and writing
exercise. After the consent procedure, students completed a
written (fall term) or online (spring term) questionnaire, of
which there were four versions with each consisting of 50
questions on the same topics7. Instructors distributed the ver-
sions randomly with approximately balanced numbers within
each section of students (approximately 14-18 students). We
achieved a strong completion rate of 85%, unsurprising given
that students were encouraged to answer all the questions;
hence, the results are strongly representative of the cohort.
However, in some cases, items were left blank or answers
were infeasible, so our observation counts vary slightly across
4 For the Forbes rankings see: forbes.com/top-colleges/list/. For the
U.S. News Rankings see: colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
colleges/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges/data.
5 The full survey instrument can be found in the appendix.
6 There are a handful of students that are not represented in the sample
because of scheduling, because they validated out of the course, or because
they may have taken the class as a freshman. We have some data on N=1,055
(89%) of the class and complete data on N=1,028 (87%) of the class.
7 The four versions differed deliberately and randomly along a few dimen-
sions. We varied the framing (gain vs. loss) for the disease policy question
(6) and military convoy question (18). We varied the presentation of the
information (words vs. pictures) for the $30K loan allocation question (17)
and the $500 retirement savings question (16). We varied the partners (West
Point company peer vs. High School peer) for the dictator game question
(36) and ultimatum game question (39). We provided peer priming using a
question (32) in two versions. Finally, we varied the order (early vs. late) for
the logic questions (13, 14, 15). The questions were otherwise identical and
we control for the version in our analyses.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
College Entrance Exam and Class Rank (CEER) 1028 605,73 67,96 387 780
Cumulative Academic Performance Score (CAPS) 1028 3,02 0,556 1,42 4,22
Community Leader Score (CLS) 1028 615,65 50,23 427 745
Recruited Athlete (Recath) 1028 0,183 0,387 0 1
Cumulative Physical Performance Score (CPPS) 1028 2,84 0,420 1,36 3,93
Prior Service 1028 0,042 0,200 0 1
Female 1028 0,174 0,379 0 1
Black 1028 0,086 0,280 0 1
Hispanic 1028 0,078 0,268 0 1
Asian 1028 0,068 0,252 0 1
Note. Department of Defense Data. See text for variable definitions.
Table 1. Sample summary statistics
questions. For each student we also observed the timing of the
survey (date and time), the timing of the course (scheduling
day and time), and the assigned course instructor.
We combined the survey data with cadet administrative
data for each of the respondents8. Demographic data included
race and gender; age data were also available but lacked suf-
ficient variation to use effectively. Cadets who served in the
military prior to entering West Point are recorded (Prior ser-
vice). The reason for inclusion here is that the cadets will
be older, have more military experience, and, therefore, may
have different risk profiles than other cadets. Admissions
data included measures of the student’s academic, physical,
and leadership potential9. The College Entrance Exam and
Class Rank (CEER) score is a West Point metric that com-
bines standardized test scores (SAT or ACT) and high school
class rank to evaluate the academic potential of applicants.
The Community Leader Score (CLS) combines service and
leadership activities to evaluate leadership potential10. Cadets
directly recruited to West Point to play a sport were also
recorded (recath). Finally, student performance data at West
Point included first-year cumulative academic performance
scores (caps) and physical performance scores (cpps), both of
which are scored on a 0-4.33 scale. Table 1 presents summary
statistics for the sample’s administrative and demographic
data.
To elicit the risk preferences of the students, the question-
naire presented a range of choices in several domains. Table
2 summarizes the key questions and the tabulated risk scores
(see the Appendix for the full survey items). Because each
8 The survey data were merged to the administrative data by the Office of
Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) at West Point. The data were
returned in a deidentified form.
9 For more information, see: usma.edu/admissions/SitePages/Home.aspx
or rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research reports/RR700/RR723/RAND R
R723.pdf
10 USMA uses these measures to designate some candidates as scholars
(i.e., CEER≥650) and/or leaders (i.e., CLS≥650). We use the raw scores in
this analysis as opposed to using dichotomous variable designations.
question has different types of answers, it is difficult to com-
pare the raw responses across domains. As a result, we assign
each cadet a score (Scorei) for each risk measure ranging
from -1 for risk averse to +1 for risk seeking, with a score of
0 indicating risk neutrality. The purpose of constructing these
indices is to normalize risk measurements across questions
and facilitate comparisons across domains. We discuss our
method for scoring each item below.
Our initial attempt to identify risk preferences was to ask
each cadet for a simple self-assessment, which we believed
would provide insight into whether his or her answers aligned
with observed risk preferences from the rest of the survey;
this general method was validated by Dohman et al. (2011).
To quantify this Self-Assessment score, we took cadets’ re-
sponses to how willing they are to take risks compared to their
peers, on a 0-10 scale, and rescaled it between -1 for most
risk averse to +1 for most risk-seeking, with each point be-
ing associated with an increase of 0.2 on the self-assessment
score.
Our next attempt to identify cadet risk preferences cen-
tered on games of chance and aimed to assess both their will-
ingness to enter and their willingness to pay in risky lottery
scenarios. The Lottery Choice scenario attempts to measure
cadets’ willingness to take risk in a coin toss game. Cadets
who engage in a coin toss with a lower expected value than the
guaranteed award are seen as risk seeking; cadets who refuse
to do a coin toss with a higher expected value than the guar-
anteed reward are seen as risk averse; and cadets who choose
the coin toss with the expected value equal to the guaranteed
reward are seen as neither risk seeking nor risk averse. Our
Willingness to Pay Lottery Choice scenario is very similar,
with cadets who were willing to pay more than the expected
winnings scored as risk seeking, those who would pay less
than the expected value scored as risk averse, and those pay-
ing exactly the expected value as neither risk-seeking nor
risk-averse.
We next widened our purview to an assessment of financial
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Risk Measure Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Self-Assessmenta Compared to other cadets, how willing are you to take risks (0-10
scale).
1009 -0,078 0,460 -1 1
Lottery Choice Choose between (a) $150 and (b) 50/50 chance of win $300/win
$40; if answer (a), choose between $150 and 50/50 chance to win
$300/win $100; if answer (b), choose between $150 and 50/50 chance
to win $250/win $40.
1026 -0,288 0,669 -1 1
WTP Lottery Choice How much would you pay to enter a lottery with a 50/50 chance to
win $250/$0.
1017 -0,895 0,371 -1 1
Retirement Savings Fraction of $500 monthly retirement savings allocated to single com-
pany stock, mutual fund, bond, or savings account.
1028 -0,025 0,338 -1 1
One-Time Savings Fraction of $30,000 loan allocated to single company stock, mutual
fund, bond, or savings account.
1028 -0,171 0,351 -1 1
Financial Behaviors How frequently do you: buy and sell stocks / gamble (Never, Rarely,
Sometimes, Frequently).
1021 -0,832 0,484 -1 1
Driving Behaviorsa How frequently do you: drive while tired / not wear seatbelt (Never,
Rarely, Sometimes, Frequently).
1024 -0,763 0,519 -1 1
Smoking Behaviors How frequently do you: smoke (Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Fre-
quently).
1025 -0,719 0,695 -1 1
Leg Injuryb Given a moderately injured leg would you: take painkillers and use a
brace or have surgery that cures or causes permanent damage.
1027 -0,439 0,899 -1 1
Disease Outbreakab Given a disease outbreak would you: save 200 for sure or save 600
with 33% probability and none with 67% probability.
1026 0,469 0,499 0 1
Military Convoy Given a dangerous mission would you choose: 40 soldiers die for
sure or 33% probability nobody dies and 67% probability 60 soldiers
die.
1025 0,364 0,481 0 1
Note. Department of Defense data. The table reports the summary statistics for the risk measure in each row.See Appendix for survey
items and text for details on the scoring for each measure. All measures are scaled such that higher values reflect more willingness to take
risk. Survey Item 47 corresponds to Self-Assessment, 3, 3a, and 3b to Lottery Choice, 4 to WTP Lottery Choice, 16a-16d to Retirement
Savings, 17a-17d to One-Time Savings, 43d, 43g to Financial Behavior, 43b, 43f to Driving Behavior, 47 to Self-Assessment, 43a to Smoking
Behavior, 7 to Leg Injury, 6 to Disease Outbreak, 18 to Military Convoy.
a Indicates that the question has been reverse scored for consistency (for Driving Behavior only the seatbelt question was reverse scored).
b Indicates that the question was asked using a loss frame for one of the two choices (Disease Outbreak or Military Convoy) and a gain frame
for the other (randomized using different versions).
Table 2. Measures of willingness to take risk
risk preferences. Our Monthly Retirement Savings scenario
attempts to gauge cadet risk preferences by giving cadets a pre-
determined amount of money to allocate to retirement savings
and observing the proportion that go into risky assets versus
safe assets (see Lusardi and Mitchell for similar question con-
structs). Our scoring identifies single-company stock as most
risky, savings accounts as most risk averse, with mutual funds
and bonds as respectively between the two extremes. Given
the long time horizon to retirement for this student population,
we deem mutual funds to be the risk-neutral investment11. Our
11 Neither bonds nor mutual funds are “risk neutral” strictly speaking. We
One Time Savings scenario is very similar to our Monthly
Retirement Savings scenario. However, unlike the retirement
scenario, the One Time Savings decision does not specify a
time horizon for achieving their goals12.
treated mutual funds as the mid-point arbitrarily, but coding it differently has
little impact on the results.
12 This is a familiar scenario to cadets, as every year Juniors at the United
States Military Academy are offered a pre-commissioning loan known as
the “Cow Loan”. In recent years the loan has been in excess of $35,000
with interest rates of approximately 0.75% for five years. The lack of a time
horizon has some impact on potential estimation of implied discount rates,
but does not change the underlying risk of the investment.
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With a similar desire to ascertain behavioral risk aversion,
we provided cadets with a Leg Injury scenario in which cadets
had to choose between wearing a brace and taking painkillers,
or undergoing an operation that could either cure them or
permanently damage their knee. Cadets who declined the
surgery were deemed risk averse, and those who put their
knee at risk of permanent damage deemed risk-seeking.
We also explored behavioral risk aversion when their
cadets’ decisions directly affected the well-being of others.
A Disease Outbreak scenario (see Tversky and Kahneman,
1981) gave the cadets two choices: (1) a 100% chance (cer-
tainty) of saving 200 people, or (2) a 33% chance of saving
600 people and a 67% chance of saving none. Similarly, a
Military Convoy scenario put cadets in charge of selecting
a convoy route where one choice would certainly kill 40 of
60 soldiers, and the other choice offered a 33% chance of
no casualties and a 67% chance of losing all 60 soldiers. In
both scenarios the leaders who took the slightly riskier chance
(with 198 expected lives saved for Disease Outbreak and 40.2
expected casualties for Military Convoy) were deemed more
risk-seeking, while those who did not were assessed as neither
risk seeking nor risk averse.
Finally, in an attempt to go beyond the hypothetical, we
asked cadets about the frequency with which they gamble
and trade stocks. From their responses, we generated a vari-
able representing the riskiness of their Financial Behavior.
We also asked cadets how frequently they drive while tired,
do not wear their seatbelts, and smoke cigarettes. Based
on those responses, we generated variables for Driving and
Smoking Behaviors. For the Financial, Driving, and Smoking
Behaviors, we scored cadets who rarely or never engage in
such behavior as risk averse, and cadets who sometimes or
frequently engage in such behavior as risk seeking13. The
West Point honor code should reduce intentional dishonesty
and reduce the potential impacts of biases introduced by that
dishonesty.
Next, using our administrative and demographic data, we
evaluate the stability of these risk preference measures in our
sample. To investigate possible correlation among answers,
we run a Spearman rank-order correlation on the scores for the
eleven risk scores. The simple correlations capture the gen-
eral nature of risk preferences across contexts, although they
cannot determine the specific nature of any inconsistencies.
Overall, we find evidence of stability among our financial
risk measures. Additionally, we find these financial risk mea-
sures to have significant correlations to many of our other risk
measures.
We also explore whether personal characteristics have
predictive power over observed risk preferences, using an
Ordinary Least Squares model (Equation 1) that regresses
13 For Financial and Driving Behavior, where two related questions were
asked, each question was scored 0 (Never), 1 (Rarely), 2 (Sometimes), or 3
(Frequently). The values of the responses to the related questions was used,
with a value >= 4 deemed risk seeking , <= 2 risk averse, and values of 3
risk neutral. As Smoking Behavior was based on only one question, there
was no possibility cadets were deemed risk neutral.
each of the 11 risk scores on student-level characteristics:
Scorei = β0 +β1CEERi+β2CAPSi+β3CLSi+β4RecAthi
+β5CPPSi+β6PriorServicei+β7Femalei+β8Blacki
+β9Hispanici+β10Asiani+λver+θinst + εi
(1)
Scorei is the constructed score for each of our risk items
(1 through 11), and the right-hand-side variables were defined
above. We introduce fixed effects, λver and θinst , to control
for potential variation across survey versions and instructors.
Because of the potential interaction between domain char-
acteristics and personal characteristics, we do not assign, a
priori, any expected sign to the control variables. For exam-
ple, we might expect recruited athletes to be less likely to
engage in some risky behaviors like smoking, but they may be
more likely to engage in other risky behaviors like high-speed
driving. A possible exception is the relatively well-established
empirical finding that females exhibit more relative risk aver-
sion than males (Kruger, 2004; Eckel and Grossman, 2008;
Sapienza et al., 2009; Borghans, et al., 2009).
Identification of unbiased causal estimates requires us to
satisfy the Gauss-Markov assumptions. Our data are only ob-
servational, and so we likely fail to satisfy the zero conditional
mean assumption. As a result, even though our vector of con-
trol variables is relatively rich, our estimates may be biased
and so we report and describe the observed relationships with-
out causal language. In addition, we report the estimates for
our control variables as they should generate insights about
potential latent impacts of different characteristics on risk
perceptions, as noted earlier in the paper.
Results
The summary statistics in Table 2 suggest that cadets are, on
average, risk averse, because the means for the majority of the
scores are negative. The positive sign on the last two scores
in Table 2 is an artifact of the fact that these two measures
used zero as their lower bound, rather than -1. For both
Disease Outbreak and Military Convoy, the means fall below
0.5, indicating that fewer than half of respondents opted for
the risk-seeking option14. A finding of overall risk aversion is
consistent with other studies (Harrison and Ru¨tstrom, 2008a)
and shows that this military population follows the broad
tendency of the general population although we make no
claim about the relative risk aversion of the military population
relative to the non-military population.
14 For these two scenarios, cadets had to select from two risky options.
Accordingly, we scored their options as risk neutral (0) if the cadet chose the
option with the greater expected positive outcome and risk-seeking (+1) if the
cadet chose the option with a lower expected positive outcome. We believe
selecting the option based on expected value represents a risk neutral decision
as opposed to risk averse. However, if coded as -1 or +1, these measures
would also reflect risk aversion (Military Convoy mean =-0.280 and Disease
Outbreak mean = -0.578).
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Using the responses on each of the eleven risk measures,
we then analyze the stability of risk preferences across multi-
ple domains using Spearman rank-order correlations. Table 3
presents the results and shows that 26 of the 55 correlations are
significant at the 10% level or lower, although almost all have
small correlation coefficients. The average statistically signifi-
cant correlation is .0468, the average correlation is .0226, and
only eight correlations are stronger, in absolute terms, than
.10. The three strongest correlations involve Risks 3, 4, and 5,
all three of which deal with financial risk, so the strong corre-
lation is not surprising. The number of statistically significant
correlations across our domains indicates a surprising degree
of stability of aggregate risk preferences in our sample; the
small size of these correlations might suggest less economic
significance. However, Einav et al. (2012) argue that small
correlations between risk preference measures or choices (i.e.,
0.16 to 0.26 in their setting) actually reflect large economic
relationships. While their observed correlations are larger
than ours, they measure choices in fewer and less disparate
domains than we do. As a result, our results may still reflect a
reasonable degree of domain general risk preferences.
Also notable in Table 3 is the significance of the One
Time Savings Decision’s correlation with 8 of the other 10
risk measures. This measure of financial risk –a single savings
decision with no explicit long-term objective like retirement–
has a significant positive correlation with the Self-Assessment,
Willingness to Pay Lottery Choice, Retirement Savings Deci-
sion, and the three behavioral risk measures, and a significant
negative correlation with the Leg Injury and Military Convoy
decisions. A riskier decision in the financial domain suggests
riskier decisions across several of the other domains, but not
the last where it suggests more risk-neutral decisions.
The negative correlation with our military convoy route
decision indicates the more willing an individual is to engage
in risky behavior oneself, the less willing they are to expose
others to risk. Our data are observational, so this estimate may
not reflect a causal relationship, but the observed correlation
is consistent with the broader economic literature on the dif-
ferences between personal-maximizing and other-regarding
behavior (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1996). This result could have
interesting and important implications for military planners
in that more common measures of financial risk-taking do
not appear to be directly related to military risk-taking. So,
standard lottery choices may not be an effective predictor of
military decisions. Self-assessed risk preference, however,
shows some degree of correlation. These issues needs to be
carefully investigated as it might fundamentally change the
way we assess risk preference of military leaders.
For a more refined examination, we used a paired t-test to
examine the within-subject pairwise stability of preferences
(Table 4). As can be seen, in virtually all cases measures
in different domains are statistically different, suggesting lit-
tle evidence of stability. And, interestingly, in almost all
cases, self-reported risk preferences are less risk averse than
those found in specific domains. Taken together, the data
indicate that there is some degree of correlation in risk pref-
erences across domains in the aggregate, but within-subject
comparisons shows that, on average, there is a great deal of
heterogeneity in preferences across those domains.
While the summary statistics and correlations provide
useful insights into how risk preferences may vary across
broadly defined groups, they do not help us understand what
drives the differences among members of the same group. To
examine individual-level variations, we regress risk responses
for each question against key personal characteristics, such
as academic aptitude, athletic ability, gender, and ethnicity,
using Equation 1. Table 5 presents the baseline regression
results.
Consistent with the descriptive statistics from the overall
sample, risk aversion dominates the individual-level regres-
sion results. Overall, only two positive coefficients were
statistically significant in the eleven regressions (indicating
those factors are associated with more risk-taking), compared
to fourteen negative coefficients (indicating those factors are
associated with more risk-aversion) that were statistically sig-
nificant. The remainder of this section describes the results in
greater detail.
Academic readiness (CEER) is only statistically (and in-
versely) related to Financial Behavior. In that case, holding all
else equal, a one standard deviation increase in CEER score
(67.96 point) is associated with a 5.03% decrease in the risk
score (more risk averse). Somewhat intuitively, this result
indicates that more academically prepared students tend to be
more risk averse, on average, than less well prepared students.
It is critical to note, however, that while the result is statisti-
cally significant, it is questionable whether it is economically
significant: a one standard deviation in CEER score (roughly
a 10% change) results in a small increase in measured risk
aversion.
Academic performance (CAPS) only correlates signifi-
cantly (and negatively) with the Military Convoy decision. In
that case, holding all else equal, a one standard deviation in-
crease in CAPS score (0.556 point) is associated with a 9.72%
decrease in the risk score (more risk averse). Again, this result
indicates that more academically proficient students tend to
be more risk averse when it comes to taking risk in this mili-
tary decision-making arena than less academically proficient
students. Leadership potential (CLS), by contrast, is not sta-
tistically significant with any of the risk measures. The CLS
measures, in part, leadership positions held prior to college,
often captains of high school sports teams15. Some of the
expected variation with this measure may have been captured
by recruited athletes and prior service military measures.
Recruited athlete (RecAth) correlates significantly (and
negatively) only with the option on Leg Surgery. Holding all
else equal, being a recruited athlete is associated with a 0.152
decrease in the score for deciding to take the riskier option in
the Leg Surgery scenario.
15 In the most recent West Point admissions profile, 771 of 1257 admitted
cadets were team captains in high school.
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Self Lottery WTP Lottery Retirement One-Time Financial Driving Smoking Leg Disease
Assessment Choice Choice Savings Savings Behavior Behavior Behavior Injury Outbreak
Lottery -0,0493
Choice
WTP Lottery 0,028 0,0534*
Choice
Retirement -0,0953* 0,02 0,0185
Savings
One-Time -0,0948* 0,015 0,0612* 0,6576*
Savings
Financial -0,0932* 0,011 0,0748* 0,1670* 0,2118*
Behavior
Driving -0,1131* 0,035 0,0671* 0,0645* 0,1034* 0,1190*
Behavior
Smoking -0,0985* -0,04 0,0018 0,0586* 0,0572* 0,0836* 0,1294*
Behavior
Leg 0,0491 -0,04 -0,0318 -0,0908* -0,0694* 0,0011 0,0375 0,0540∗
Injury
Disease -0,0032 -0,04 0,0635* -0,0038 -0,007 0,0173 -0,022 0,0427 0,03
Outbreak
Military 0,0655* 0,004 -0,0411 0,0032 -0,0586* 0,0141 -0,024 0,0047 -0 -0,1620*
Convoy
Note. Department of Defense Data. For a description of Risk Measures, see Table 2. * reflects p ≤ 0,10
Table 3. Risk preference correlation estimates
Physical performance (CPPS) correlates negatively with
two of the risk domains. Holding all else equal, individuals
whose first-year Physical GPA score is one standard devia-
tion (0.420) higher, on average, than other cadets are 7.64%
less likely to engage in the risky Smoking Behavior option
and 5.42% less likely to opt for the riskier Disease Outbreak
option. The relationship between physical performance and
not smoking follows intuition. However, there is no plausible
intuition to tie this score to the Disease Outbreak decision and
may simply be spurious correlation.
Prior military service is not significanty related to any
of the risk measures. While prior military service might be
expected to have an impact on risk preferences, especially in
the military contexts, we find no evidence of differences in
preferences between cadets with and without prior military
service.
Being female (Female) significantly correlates with four
measures inversely and two measures directly. Compared to
male cadets and holding all else equal, female cadets score
.100 points lower on the Retirement Savings decision, 0.139
points lower on the One Time Savings decision, .112 points
lower on Financial Risky Behavior, and 0.164 points lower
on Smoking Behavior. Conversely, females scored 0.141
points higher on the Leg Injury decision (opting for surgery
more often) and 0.075 points higher than males on the Self-
Assessment.
Being African American (Black) significantly correlates
with only one of the measures. Comparing to non-black
cadets and holding all else equal, a black cadet scores .141
points lower on the Risky Driving Behavior decision. Like-
wise, being Hispanic (Hispanic) significantly correlates neg-
atively with only one of the specifications. Comparing to
non-Hispanic cadets and holding all else equal, a Hispanic
cadet scores .105 points lower on the Military Convoy de-
cision. Finally, being Asian (Asian) significantly correlates
negatively with three of these measures. Compared to non-
Asian cadets and holding all else equal, an Asian cadet scores
.104 points lower on the Retirement Savings decision, .092
points lower on the One Time Savings decision, and .123
points lower on the Military Convoy decision.
With a vast majority of variables lacking significance,
Table 5 illustrates how difficult it can be to predict decisions
under uncertainty with observable variables. Some of the
regression results reveal intuitive relationships, such as strong
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Self Lottery WTP Lottery Retirement One-Time Financial Driving Smoking Leg Disease
Assessment Choice Choice Savings Savings Behavior Behavior Behavior Injury Outbreak
Lottery 0,201***
Choice
WTP Lottery 0,892*** 0,605***
Choice
Retirement -0,055*** -0,263*** -0,869***
Savings
One-Time 0,091*** -0,116*** -0,722*** 0,147***
Savings
Financial 0,753*** 0,540*** -0,065*** 0,806*** 0,658***
Behavior
Driving 0,688*** 0,473*** -0,132*** 0,738*** 0,590*** -0,067***
Behavior
Smoking 0,638*** 0,434*** -0,170*** 0,695*** 0,548*** 0,025*** -0,042*
Behavior
Leg 0,367*** 0,161*** -0,447*** 0,424*** 0,276*** -0,377*** -0,312*** -0,279***
Injury
Disease -0,553*** -0,759*** -1,36*** -0,495*** -0,642*** -1,30*** -1,23*** -1,19*** -0,918***
Outbreak
Military -0,442*** -0,647*** -1,25*** -0,384*** -0,531*** -1,19*** -1,12*** -1,08*** -0,807*** 0,110***
Convoy
Note. Department of Defense Data. For a description of Risk Measures, see Table 2. * reflects p ≤ 0,10
Table 4. Paired t-test mean differences
physical fitness being associated with a lower likelihood of
frequent smoking and recruited athletes being associated with
a lower likelihood of electing risky surgery. However, two
variables in Table 5 show surprising predictive power –being
female and being Asian. We therefore analyze these two
variables in more depth to explore the extent of the variation
and possible interpretations.
Based on the regression results, being female is the sin-
gle most effective predictor of risk preferences among cadets.
Female (N=179) was significant in describing six risk factors
–three financial risk measures (Retirement Savings, One-Time
Savings, and Risky Financial Behavior), Smoking Behav-
ior, Self-Assessment, and the Leg Injury decision. For the
first four, female cadets scored approximately 10.0%, 13.9%,
11.2%, and 16.4% higher on the risk-avoiding spectrum than
males. In the last two, however, female cadets scored 14.1%
and 7.45% higher on the risk-seeking spectrum than males.
There are a few potential explanations for this gender-based
difference in risk preferences.
In terms of the Leg Injury decision, it is difficult to find
a straightforward interpretation for why women elect risky
surgery more frequently. One reason may be that women are
more likely to trust doctors than men (Bonds et al., 2004).
But other studies show that men are more likely to opt for
some forms of surgery than women (Karlson et al., 1997). A
plausible, albeit undocumented, hypothesis is that the decision
to attend West Point is inherently riskier for females. Because
female cadets compose a smaller portion of the student body
than their male counterparts, they may have a higher prob-
ability of being selected for hazardous duty than their male
peers. Thus, their self-selection into West Point may help
explain their higher self-assessment for risk-taking and higher
risk tolerance for domains like surgery than the male cadets.
However, their higher self-ratings do not appear to carry into
financial decision-making, and so their self-reported risk tol-
erances may be an anomaly or they may see financial risk
as quite different from physical risk. Despite the results of
higher risk seeking on the last two variables, however, the
general finding that females are more risk averse is consistent
with findings from evolutionary biology (Kruger, 2004) and
experimental economics (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), and
applied risk analysis (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001).
Given the importance of the female and Asian variables,
we revisit the descriptive statistics from Table 1 and analyze
them by gender and race in Table 6. Taking a look at the
gender question first, Panel A presents the risk measures by
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
WTP
Variables Self Lottery Lottery Retirement One Time Financial Driving Smoking Leg Disease Military
Assessment Choice Choice Savings Savings Behavior Behavior Behavior Injury Outbreak Convoy
CEER 0.000235 4.87e-05 0.000412 -1.29e-05 1.41e-05 -0.000616* -0.000191 0.000398 0.000132 -4.57e-05 0.000269
(0.000321) (0.000454) (0.000259) (0.000219) (0.000226) (0.000354) (0.000373) (0.000468) (0.000613) (0.000309) (0.000291)
CAPS 0.0198 -0.0310 -0.0311 0.0136 -0.00734 -0.0141 -0.0552 -0.0714 -0.125 0.0206 -0.0636*
(0.0403) (0.0546) (0.0377) (0.0306) (0.0304) (0.0472) (0.0430) (0.0577) (0.0763) (0.0391) (0.0365)
CLS 4.77e-05 -0.000216 0.000130 0.000312 0.000151 6.08e-05 -0.000352 0.000104 -0.000948 0.000301 -8.18e-05
(0.000300) (0.000432) (0.000230) (0.000216) (0.000230) (0.000281) (0.000321) (0.000466) (0.000601) (0.000296) (0.000265)
RecAth -0.0108 0.0998 0.0369 -0.0341 -0.0159 -0.00985 0.00400 -0.0785 -0.172** -0.0265 -0.0112
(0.0446) (0.0616) (0.0327) (0.0306) (0.0339) (0.0490) (0.0496) (0.0592) (0.0768) (0.0411) (0.0379)
CPPS -0.0228 -0.0342 -0.0332 0.0325 0.0196 0.0636 0.0528 -0.131** 0.00441 -0.0657* -0.0293
(0.0406) (0.0566) (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0308) (0.0390) (0.0443) (0.0608) (0.0778) (0.0380) (0.0348)
Prior Service -0.0217 -0.0600 0.00813 0.0369 0.0295 -0.00725 0.0464 -0.141 0.0698 0.0988 -0.0803
(0.0759) (0.0965) (0.0581) (0.0563) (0.0560) (0.0883) (0.0712) (0.0949) (0.155) (0.0815) (0.0707)
Female 0.0745** 0.0286 -0.0167 -0.0997*** -0.139*** -0.112*** -0.0395 -0.164*** 0.141* 0.0184 0.00245
(0.0351) (0.0549) (0.0302) (0.0281) (0.0288) (0.0301) (0.0412) (0.0475) (0.0779) (0.0383) (0.0343)
Black -0.0134 0.0840 -0.0320 -0.0329 -0.0458 -0.0372 -0.141** -0.0197 -0.0442 0.0563 -0.0193
(0.0593) (0.0846) (0.0337) (0.0417) (0.0433) (0.0658) (0.0565) (0.0834) (0.110) (0.0574) (0.0509)
Hispanic -0.0292 -0.0341 0.0829 -0.0646 -0.0365 -0.0280 -0.0938 0.0211 0.0242 0.00231 -0.105**
(0.0619) (0.0796) (0.0563) (0.0411) (0.0460) (0.0540) (0.0615) (0.0892) (0.110) (0.0566) (0.0501)
Asian 0.0424 0.00495 0.0441 -0.104** -0.0921** -0.0753 -0.0232 -0.0448 0.0279 0.0154 -0.123**
(0.0550) (0.0829) (0.0576) (0.0436) (0.0410) (0.0509) (0.0692) (0.0794) (0.117) (0.0543) (0.0488)
Mean -0,078 -0,288 -0,895 -0,025 -0,171 -0,832 -0,763 -0,719 -0,439 0,469 0,364
Observations 1,009 1,026 1,017 1,028 1,028 1,021 1,024 1,025 1,027 1,026 1,025
R-squared 0.024 0.026 0.042 0.047 0.059 0.034 0.026 0.040 0.034 0.209 0.304
Note. Department of Defense Data. The table reports OLS estimates of equation 1 for the outcome listed in each column. See text for variable
definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. *, **, and *** reflect p≤ 0.10, p≤ 0.05 and p≤ 0.01.
Table 5. OLS regressions of the correlates of risk preference measures
gender. The results reveal that, on average, females are more
risk averse in 7 of the 11 risk measures, with exceptions being
Self-Assessment, Lottery Choice, Leg Injury decision, and
Military Convoy decision. While some of the differences
are numerically large, they are not universal. Consider, for
example, the One-Time Savings Decision. Here, females are
roughly twice as risk averse as males, a result that Figure 1
displays visually. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of male
responses is more right skewed (risk seeking) than female
responses, resulting in a higher average value for males.
The implications of this result for one’s portfolio choices
are clear16; what is less clear is whether these observed differ-
ences translate into differences relevant for future leadership
within the military. For example, because officers are often
called upon to counsel soldiers on financial matters, signif-
icant gender-based differences in risk preferences may lead
to different financial advice from female leaders. While we
certainly make no determination of what is “correct” advice,
these results do indicate the need for at least some training
on (1) risks and returns of various investment alternatives and
(2) possible variations in the risk preferences of subordinates
16 There is no “right” portfolio allocation. We refer here to choices made
facing a portfolio with known risk/return profiles.
Figure 1
so that advice can be sensitive to risk tolerances. Overall,
the higher risk aversion expressed by females suggests that
decision-making in the field could differ as well. Data on
actual field choices would help to test the validity of this
finding.
In Table 6, Panel B presents the risk measures by Asian
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Panel A: Gender Panel B: Race/Ethnicity
Male Female Non-Asian Asian
N N Diff N N Diff
Mean Mean t-stat Mean Mean t-stat
Variable (SD) (SD) p-value (SD) (SD) p-value
832 177 -0,08 941 68 -0,06
Self-Assessment -0,09 -0,02 -1.98 -0,08 -0,03 -0,96
(0,47) (0,40) 0,048 (0,46) (0,42) 0,340
848 178 -0,06 957 69 0,00
Lottery Choice -0,30 -0,24 -1,03 -0,29 -0,29 0,02
(0,67) (0,65) 0,303 (0,67) (0,64) 0,986
841 176 0,02 948 69 -0,06
WTP Lottery Choice -0,89 -0,91 0,56 -0,90 -0,84 -1,26
(0,37) (0,36) 0,574 (0,36) (0,47) 0,209
849 179 0,11 958 70 0,09
Retirement Savings -0,01 -0,12 3,97 -0,02 -0,11 2,22
(0,33) (0,34) 0,000 (0,34) (0,36) 0,027
849 179 0,15 958 70 0,08
One-Time Savings -0,15 -0,29 5,10 -0,16 -0,25 1,93
(0,35) (0,35) 0,000 (0,35) (0,35) 0,054
845 176 0,12 951 70 0,07
Financial Behavior -0,81 -0,93 3,03 -0,83 -0,90 1,23
(0,51) (0,31) 0,002 (0,49) (0,39) 0,220
848 176 0,03 954 70 0,01
Driving Behavior -0,76 -0,79 0,76 -0,76 -0,77 0,15
(0,52) (0,50) 0,447 (0,52) (0,54) 0,884
848 177 0,16 955 70 0,06
Smoking Behavior -0,69 -0,85 2,83 -0,72 -0,77 0,65
(0,72) (0,52) 0,005 (0,70) (0,64) 0,514
848 179 -0,12 957 70 -0,07
Leg Injury -0,46 -0,34 -1,61 -0,44 -0,37 -0,65
(0,89) (0,94) 0,107 (0,90) (0,94) 0,514
847 179 0,01 957 69 -0,03
Disease Outbreak 0,47 0,46 0,32 0,47 0,49 -0,41
(0,50) (0,50) 0,752 (0,50) (0,50) 0,680
846 179 -0,04 955 70 0,13
Military Convoy 0,36 0,40 -1,00 0,37 0,24 2,18
(0,48) (0,49) 0,317 (0,48) (0,43) 0,029
Note. Department of Defense data. The table reports the results of t-tests for equality of
means for the risk measure indicated in each column by the demographic characteristic
in each panel. See text for variable definitions.
Table 6. Comparison of risk measures by select demographic characteristics
Risk preferences in future military leaders — 22/24
Figure 2
ethnicity and shows significant levels of risk aversion among
Asian-American cadets. Figure 2 shows the distribution on
the same variable that we examined more closely for female
cadets above (One-Time Savings Decision). Again, the dis-
tribution of non-Asian responses is right-skewed relative to
Asian responses, resulting in a higher average index value.
Benjamin et. al (2010) found that Asian-American students
at Harvard were both more risk averse and more impatient
than white students when unprimed by their racial identity
(Benjamin et al, 2010). In our findings, Asian cadets are
consistently more risk averse than the non-Asian cadets (7 of
11 risk measures). Although our results for Asians are more
consistent than for Blacks and Hispanics, they all point in the
general direction of more risk-aversion than for comparable
Whites; this is similar to previous work with other populations
(e.g. Yao, Gutter, and Hanna, 2005).
Conclusions and future research
By eliciting and then analyzing the risk preferences of a sam-
ple of West Point cadets, this paper provides insight on po-
tential patterns of risk aversion among future military leaders.
Our experimental design allowed us to examine risk aversion
in a controlled environment that trains and graduates students
who are now real decision-makers (junior officers) in the U.S.
Army. Reassuringly, many of the findings here are corrobo-
rated by other studies. First, risk aversion appears to be fairly
context-specific. That is, there is no consistent risk aversion
response across domains. At the same time, the aggregate rela-
tionship (at least pairwise) between self-reported risk aversion
and context-specific risk aversion suggests that a core element
undergirds responses across domains. The continued search
for better metrics of risk aversion are required to develop more
appropriate, but still manageable, ways of measuring risk in
the field.
Second, females appear to be more risk averse than males,
although there were a few areas of exception. Differences in
risk aversion across gender has implications in the civilian
world, shaping job choice, product choice, parenting choice,
and so on. But, with the advent of female participation in
combat roles and an increased number of women entering the
military, these differences could also have implications for
military programs. This is not to say that there is a “right”
level of risk aversion. Rather, the systematic differences im-
ply potential differences in decisions/outcomes under similar
risky choices. Understanding risk preference decisions, in
general, may lead to better job matching for soldiers and bet-
ter training that more broadly addresses the topics of risk
preferences/choices and desired military decisions to reach
mission success. It is a topic that needs more study, perhaps
by linking objective data on observed performance with risk
preference measures.
We find that cadets, as a whole, are risk averse17. As Ault
(2003) has argued more generally that the structure of the
military (i.e., increasing centralization of decision-making) is
resulting in a greater level of risk aversion especially within
the officer corps. However, the causality seems unclear –does
increasing risk aversion in the ranks lead to greater centraliza-
tion, or does greater centralization lead to greater risk aver-
sion?
Our results might reflect one reason why risk aversion
may be increasing within the overall organization: admissions
policies favor individual characteristics that correlate with risk
aversion. For many good reasons, West Point has increased
its recruitment of high academic performers, females, and
ethnic minorities, some of which might explain a small part
of risk aversion observed in the Army’s leadership, although
any such claim warrants considerably more study and must be
balanced against other gains from increased diversity in the
West Point student body and the resulting officer corps.
Of special interest is the linkage between these risk mea-
sures and consequential decision-making while in the Army,
the existence of similar relationships in other Army com-
missioning sources (i.e., Reserve Officer Training Corps and
Officer Candidate School) and leadership groups (i.e., Non-
Commissioned Officers), and the influence of leaders’ risk
preferences on their unit decisions and their subordinates’ in-
dividual preferences. Decisions, ultimately, are a function of
risk perceptions and risk preferences. Holding risk constant,
increasing risk aversion in the officer corps will lead to more
risk averse decisions. Additionally, structural considerations,
such as punishment for incorrect decisions or exposing retire-
ment to higher levels of market risk, will lead to compound
effects (higher risk and higher risk aversion) in decisions. The
Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley recently stated that
the Army’s objective is to create leaders who are willing to
tolerate the risks associated with combat operations and other
requirements (Tan, 2016), thus these topics should be studied
in earnest.
17 Making absolute determinations on risk aversion are difficult. However,
many of the measures we use are utilized consistenty in the literature to
measure risk aversion. In that regard, we find risk aversion generally, which is
not inconsistent with the broader population results using the same elicitation
techniques.
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